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Introduction
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal pros–
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial . . . .”1 The Supreme Court has lauded this right to a speedy trial
as one of the most fundamental guaranteed by the Constitution.2 To
Christopher Ray Myers, however, this fundamental right probably
seemed like a hollow farce. By the time the Ninth Circuit filed its
opinion in the case of United States v. Myers3 on July 22, 2019, Myers
had been between state and federal custody for four years.4 The State
of Washington initially indicted Myers in May 2015 for assaulting a
1.

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

2.

See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).

3.

930 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2019).

4.

Id. at 1113, 1117–18.
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police officer when he fired a gun during a struggle with a sheriff’s
deputy,5 but Myers’ use of a firearm as a prior felon with fifteen felony
convictions6 caught the attention of the federal authorities, prompting
a federal indictment for unlawful possession of a firearm.7 The federal
authorities decided to delay the federal criminal proceedings until after
the state criminal proceedings concluded.8
Myers’ state criminal prosecution ended in a plea agreement made
in January 2017. 9 When Myers appeared before the federal district
court for the beginning of the federal proceedings against him, he
immediately moved to dismiss his federal case on Sixth Amendment
speedy trial grounds.10 Citing cases from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits,
the district court denied the motion on the grounds that delaying to
avoid a parallel prosecution with the State of Washington was a valid
reason for the federal government to delay the federal proceedings
against Myers.11 The court rejected Myers’ argument that the federal
government’s decision to delay the proceedings required a heightened
standard laid out by the Tenth Circuit.12 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed, adopting the heightened standard that the district court had
rejected, and remanded back to the district court.13
Cases like Myers raise an important dilemma about delaying
proceedings in order to avoid burdensome concurrent state and federal
prosecutions while still maintaining the accused’s constitutional right
to a speedy trial. Although the Supreme Court recognizes that the
government’s legitimate reason for delay may not violate the speedy
trial right if the overall balance of factors tips in favor of the govern–
ment,14 the Court has yet to provide guidance on whether avoiding
parallel prosecutions is always a legitimate reason under this test.
5.

Id.

6.

Man Accused of Shooting at Spokane County Deputy Has Lengthy Criminal
History, KHQ-Q6 News (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.khq.com/news/manaccused-of-shooting-at-spokane-county-deputy-has-lengthy/article_3c9a55
d4-8d2b-57ed-adaf-7f202191e28a.html [https://perma.cc/SBS9-EX79].

7.

Myers, 930 F.3d at 1117.

8.

Id. at 1118.

9.

Id.

10.

Id.

11.

United States v. Myers, No. 2:15-CR-00045-JLQ, 2017 WL 2469617, at *3
(E.D. Wash. June 7, 2017) (citing United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144,
150–51 (4th Cir. 1995), United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 555 (6th
Cir. 2003)).

12.

Myers, 2017 WL 2469617, at *3.

13.

Myers, 930 F.3d at 1121, 1123.

14.

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531–32 (1972).
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Different United States Courts of Appeals have reached divergent con–
clusions on this issue. Some circuits, like the Sixth Circuit, have ruled
that delaying federal proceedings to allow “another sovereign” to finish
its prosecution is “without question” a valid reason for the federal
government to delay proceedings.15 Other circuits, including the Ninth
Circuit in Myers, disagreed with this bright-line rule, preferring an ad
hoc approach where the district court has to consider the nature and
circumstances of the situation to determine whether the decision to
delay weighs in favor of the federal government.16
This Note will argue that the ad hoc approach developed by the
Tenth Circuit, and recently adopted by the Ninth, is the better method
for determining whether a pending state proceeding is a valid reason
for the federal government to delay a prosecution. Unlike the carte
blanche given to the federal government by the bright-line rules in the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits, the ad hoc approach allows the district court
to consider the circumstances of each case, thus allowing for a fairer
administration of criminal justice. This in turn makes the ad hoc
approach more consistent with the purpose of the Speedy Trial Clause
and with Supreme Court precedent. Part I of this Note will analyze the
history and purpose of the Speedy Trial Clause, including the Supreme
Court’s precedent, to provide the context in which this circuit split
exists. Part I will conclude that the Speedy Trial Clause is unique in
criminal procedure in that it is necessarily context-based, because both
the accused and society in general have unique and often opposing
interests in seeing the accused fairly and efficiently prosecuted. Part II
will discuss some of the interests underlying the Speedy Trial Clause
that are particularly relevant to parallel prosecutions. The discussion
in Part II will focus on three judicially recognized interests: maintaining
the separation of federal and state courts, attorney due diligence, and
logistical costs. These interests will frame the discussion of each circuit’s
approach in Part III. Finally, Part III will look at the two approaches
to determine how they work in practice and how those approaches
address the competing interests discussed in Part II. Part III will argue
that the ad hoc approach, unlike the bright-line rule, permits the
district court to consider the possible convenience of a parallel
prosecution, avoiding situations where a parallel prosecution was
15.

Schreane, 331 F.3d at 555; see also Thomas, 55 F.3d at 150; United States
v. Brown, 325 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2003).

16.

Myers, 930 F.3d at 1121; see also United States v. Seltzer, 595 F.3d 1170,
1178 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Ellis, 622 F.3d 784, 791 (7th Cir.
2010). The Third Circuit has its own outlier bright-line rule that a state
proceeding is a neutral reason that always tips against the government.
United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 2009). This Note will
not discuss this approach in detail because much of the discussion focuses
on the problem with bright-line rules generally in speedy trial cases.
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perfectly reasonable but the federal government opted not to for un–
necessary reasons. Part IV will then apply facts from four hypotheticals
to the ad hoc approach to demonstrate how the district court can use
the ad hoc approach to allow parallel prosecutions when the circum–
stances allow it.

I.

Background of the Speedy Trial Clause

With roots dating back to twelfth-century England, the speedy trial
right is an integral part of the Anglo-American legal heritage. 17
Although often attributed to the Magna Carta,18 the earliest known re–
ference to a speedy trial right was the Assize of Clarendon promulgated
by King Henry II in 1166.19 The Assize was primarily a set of procedural
rules that created a rudimentary right to an evidentiary hearing before
a jury for those accused of committing certain crimes.20 Paragraph four
of the Assize mandated that sheriffs who caught a robber, murderer, or
thief promptly notify the nearest judge and in turn required the judge
to inform the sheriff where the judge would try the accused criminal.21
A more explicit guarantee to a speedy trial right came fifty years
after the Assize of Clarendon when King John signed the Magna Carta
in 1215.22 The Magna Carta states far more clearly than the Assize,
“[t]o no one will we refuse or delay right or justice.”23 Edward Coke in
his famous Institutes held this particular provision to be fundamental

17.

See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967) (“[The right to a
speedy trial] has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage.”);
see also Kristin Saetveit, Note, Beyond Pollard: Applying the Sixth Amen–
dment’s Speedy Trial Right to Sentencing, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 481, 485 (2016).

18.

See Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223.

19.

See Saetveit, supra note 17, at 485, 486.

20.

Id. at 485–86; 1 W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 76 (3d
ed. 1922).

21.

Assize of Clarendon 1166, 12 Hen. 2., para. 4 (Eng.), reprinted in 2 English
Historical Documents 408 (David C. Douglas & George W. Greenaway
eds., 1953) (“And when a robber or murderer or thief or receiver of them has
been arrested . . . , if the justices are not about to come speedily enough
into the county where they have been taken, let the sheriffs send word to
the nearest justice by some well-informed person that they have arrested
such men, and the justices shall send back word to the sheriffs informing
them where they desire the men to be brought before them . . . .”).

22.

See Saetveit, supra note 17, at 485, 486 (citing Magna Carta para. 40
(1215), https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/magna-carta-1215 ).

23.

Magna Carta para. 40 (1215), https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/magnacarta-1215.
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to the “law and custome of England.”24 The framers of the Constitution
in turn took inspiration from Coke’s treatise. 25 By the time the
Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in 1787, four of
the future states had already adopted some form of a speedy trial right
in their constitutions. 26 At the Constitutional Convention, James
Madison proposed adding the speedy trial right to what would
eventually become the Bill of Rights without controversy.27
Despite the Framers’ holding the speedy trial right in such high
regard, there was very little legal development of the right in the courts
during the first century under the Constitution. 28 Federal courts
generally did not try to enforce the speedy trial right because of the
perceived lack of standards that courts could use to assess whether a
defendant’s speedy trial right was violated. 29 In 1905, Beavers v.
Haubert30 was the first Supreme Court case that addressed the Speedy
Trial Clause.31 The Beavers Court considered whether the Speedy Trial
Clause protected the defendant from a successive prosecution by a
different state.32 While finding that Beavers undoubtedly had a speedy
trial right, the Court did not consider that right to be “unqualified and

24.

Saetveit, supra note 17, at 486; 1 Edward Coke, The Second Part of
the Institutes of the Laws of England 56 (London, 1817) (1643).

25.

Saetveit, supra note 17, at 486. As an example, John Rutledge, the second
Chief Justice of the United States, considered Coke’s Institutes to be “almost
the foundation of our law.” Id. (quoting Catherine Drinker Bowen, The
Lion and the Throne 514 (1957)). Although he did not take part in the
Constitutional Convention, Thomas Jefferson also spoke highly of Coke’s
treatise once referring to the first part of the Institutes as “the universal
elementary book of law students.” Id. (quoting Charles Warren, History
of the American Bar 174 (1911)).

26.

Md. Const. of 1776, art. A, § 19; Pa. Const. of 1776, § 9; Vt. Const. of
1777, ch. I, § 10; Va. Bill of Rights of 1776, § 8, all reprinted in The
Federal and State Constitutions and Other Organic Laws of the
United States (Benjamin Perley Poole comp., 2d ed. 1972). Although not
guaranteeing a right to a speedy trial in criminal prosecutions, the early
constitutions of both Massachusetts and New Hampshire guaranteed the
right to relief in civil actions “without delay.” See Mass. Const., pt. 1, art.
XI (adopted 1780) and N.H. Const., art. 1, § 14 (adopted 1784), both
reprinted in Federal and State Constitutions, supra.

27.

Saetveit, supra note 17, at 486.

28.

See Brian P. Brooks, Comment, A New Speedy Trial Standard for Barker
v. Wingo: Reviving a Constitutional Remedy in an Age of Statutes, 61 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 587, 589 (1994).

29.

Id.

30.

198 U.S. 77 (1905).

31.

Brooks, supra note 28, at 589.

32.

Beavers, 198 U.S. at 86.
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absolute” given the circumstances.33 Justice McKenna, writing for the
majority, described the speedy trial right as a right that must be
“relative” based on the case’s circumstances and one that could not
ultimately be used to prevent the prosecution of “other offenses.” 34
Specifically, the Court reasoned that Beavers could not be tried at the
same time in both New York and the District of Columbia, so his speedy
trial rights had to give way to the “practical administration of justice.”35
While Beavers was the first case to recognize that competing
interests underlay the Speedy Trial Clause, Beavers only recognized a
general societal interest in “public justice” without providing specific
interests courts were bound to consider when deciding whether the
accused’s speedy trial right was violated.36 Federal courts in the period
between Beavers and Barker v. Wingo37 identified a number of interests
that they chose to consider when deciding whether a speedy trial
violation occurred.38 One commentator identifies four general interests
that the federal courts recognized in the years leading up to Barker: (1)
providing incentives for defense counsel and prosecutors to act
diligently,39 (2) discouraging purposeful or oppressive imprisonment,40
(3) ensuring the orderly conduct of proceedings and not just mere speed
of the judicial process, 41 and (4) preventing actual prejudice to the
defendant.42
Barker came in 1972 as a response to calls from the lower courts
and legal scholars advocating a uniform speedy trial test. 43 The
Supreme Court adopted a balancing test in which a court weighs the
conduct of the prosecution and defense.44 The Barker test itself set forth
four factors that the lower courts were to use to determine whether the

33.

Id.

34.

Id. at 87 (“The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent
with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant.
It does not preclude the rights of public justice. It cannot be claimed for one
offense and prevent arrest for other offenses.”).

35.

Id. at 86–87.

36.

Id.; see also Brooks, supra note 28, at 590.

37.

407 U.S. 514 (1972).

38.

Brooks, supra note 28, at 590.

39.

Id. (citing Hedgepeth v. United States, 364 F.2d 684, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).

40.

Id. (citing United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).

41.

Id. (citing Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 (1959)).

42.

Id. (citing Williams v. United States, 250 F.2d 19, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1957)).

43.

Id.

44.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972).
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government or defendant had a stronger interest in the matter.45 Those
factors are (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay,
(3) whether the defendant asserted the speedy trial right, and (4) the
prejudice to the defendant.46 The Court stated that the test inherently
required the lower courts to make its ruling on an “ad hoc basis.”47
Regarding how to apply the balancing factors, the Court stated:
We regard none of the four factors . . . as either a necessary or
sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of
speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be
considered together with such other circumstances as may be
relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts
must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process.48

By adopting its Barker balancing test, the Court explicitly rejected
two bright-line rules.49 The first was a “specified time” rule where a
criminal defendant would be entitled to a trial within a specified period
of time.50 The alternative proposal was a “demand-waiver rule” where
the defendant would be required to make a specific demand for a speedy
trial, or else they would waive the speedy trial right. 51 The Court
rejected both of these proposed rules as being too “inflexible” to
adequately protect the fundamental right to a speedy trial.52 A further
part of the Barker Court’s rationale in adopting the balancing test
rather than a rigid rule was the nature of the speedy trial right itself.
Referring back to its prior decision in Beavers, Justice Powell’s majority
opinion, supported by an almost unanimous Court, 53 reasoned that
because the accused’s speedy trial right competed with society’s inter–

45.

Id. at 530–32.

46.

Id. at 530.

47.

Id.

48.

Id. at 533.

49.

Id. at 530–32.

50.

Id. at 523.

51.

Id. at 524–25.

52.

Id. at 529–30.

53.

Justice White filed a concurring opinion which Justice Brennan joined. Id. at
536 (White, J., concurring). While agreeing with the Court’s overall
conclusion, Justice White wrote separately to stress that the defendant’s
personal interest in a speedy trial should always prevail when the government’s
interest in delaying the proceeding is “crowded dockets and prosecutorial
caseloads.” Id. at 537–38.
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ests, the analysis of the speedy trial right had to be made within the
“particular context of the case.”54
The Court’s opinion in Barker also suggests that the same level of
“ad hoc analysis” is required for the second factor, the reason for delay,
which is the factor at the center of the current circuit split.55 Justice
Powell considered this factor to be centered around the government’s
reason for delay rather than the defendant’s reason.56 Furthermore, the
Court addressed the legitimacy of the government’s reason in assessing
this factor. 57 Deliberate attempts by the government to delay a
proceeding in order to hinder the defense naturally weigh heavily
against the government. Neutral reasons like “overcrowded courts” still
weigh against the government, but to a lesser extent than bad faith
reasons because the government bears the ultimate responsibility for
such circumstances.58

II. Interests in Speedy Parallel Prosecutions
From the Supreme Court decisions in both Beavers and Barker, it
is apparent that the speedy trial right and the Barker test itself are not
meant to be governed by inflexible rules but rather must be amenable
to the competing interests in preventing delay in any given case. Those
interests are fundamentally a balancing act between the interests of the
54.

Id. at 522 (majority opinion). Although this Note focuses on the
constitutional implications of delayed federal prosecutions, it is worth briefly
mentioning the statutory speedy trial scheme. Two years after the decision
in Barker, Congress attempted to create clearer speedy trial standards by
passing the Speedy Trial Act. Brooks, supra note 28, at 602–03. Under the
Speedy Trial Act, district courts are required to bring a criminal case to trial
within seventy days following the initial indictment subject to many “tolling”
exceptions. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(a), (c)(1), (h) (2018). One such exception is a
period of delay “resulting from trial with respect to other charges against the
defendant.” Id. § 3161(h)(1)(B). At least two circuit courts have ruled that
district courts have the discretion to exclude all the time the defendant spent
in state custody. See United States v. Bigler, 810 F.2d 1317, 1320 (5th Cir.
1987) (“The federal trial judge . . . has discretion to include all of the time
spent in state custody because of state proceedings.”); United States v.
Lopez-Espindola, 632 F.2d 107, 110 (9th Cir. 1980) (“There is undoubtedly
a degree of discretion involved in ascertaining the nature of those [state]
proceedings which fall within the ‘other proceedings’ language of the
statute.”) (emphasis omitted). Regardless of the statutory scheme, federal
courts addressing the specific kind of delay in this Note’s discussion still
conduct the separate Barker constitutional analysis. See, e.g., United States
v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 147–50 (4th Cir. 1995).

55.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31.

56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

Id.
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accused being protected by an ancient fundamental right and society’s
competing interests in the accused’s effective prosecution. In formu–
lating either the bright-line rule or the ad hoc approach at the center
of this Note’s discussion, each circuit court has provided a number of
interests that it considers essential to the speedy trial analysis in these
types of cases. This section will discuss three of the more commonly
cited interests: maintaining a judicial separation between the federalstate sovereigns, prosecutorial diligence, and logistical concerns.
A.

Federal-State Separation

Maintaining a separation between the state and federal court
systems is the key interest that the circuit courts adopting the brightline rule have quoted. The bright-line rule originated in the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Thomas.59 The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning
was simple: federalism. The court found that a pending state prose–
cution was an “obvious reason” for delaying a federal prosecution
because “to [rule] otherwise would be to mire the state and federal
systems in innumerable opposing writs, . . . and generally to throw
parallel federal and state prosecutions into confusion and disarray.”60
The court ended its second factor analysis there, holding that the
government’s “plausible reason” tipped the second factor against the
defendant. 61 Three years later in United States v. Grimmond, 62 the
Fourth Circuit again addressed the issue of delaying a federal pro–
ceeding because of two pending state proceedings and in its ruling made
more explicit its commitment to preserving federalism when adopting a
bright-line rule. The court stated: “When a defendant violates the laws
of several different sovereigns, . . . at least one sovereign, and perhaps
more, will have to wait its turn at the prosecutorial turnstile. Simply
waiting for another sovereign to finish prosecuting a defendant is
without question a valid reason for delay.”63
There is some indication to suggest that the current Supreme Court
would err on the side of keeping the dual sovereigns separate.64 That
said, the Court’s precedent regarding concurrent jurisdiction and
parallel proceedings does not show as clear of a commitment to com–
plete federal-state separation when a federal court is choosing whether
or not to exercise its jurisdiction—at least in the realm of civil
59.

See Thomas, 55 F.3d at 150.

60.

Id. at 150–51.

61.

Id. at 150.

62.

137 F.3d 823 (1998).

63.

Id. at 828.

64.

See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1964, 1966 (2019) (maintaining
the dual-sovereign exception in double jeopardy law despite extensive schol–
arship against maintaining the exception).
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procedure. Abstention is a judicially created doctrine in federal courts
that allows a district court to exercise its discretion in postponing or
abstaining entirely from exercising its jurisdiction when the court shares
jurisdiction with the state.65 Virtually every form of abstention exists
as a means for the federal court to yield authority to the state tribunal
in the interests of federalism. 66 Although mostly a creature of civil
procedure, the Supreme Court has applied the abstention doctrine to
criminal proceedings as well.67
Although abstention is within the discretion of the district court,
the court may only exercise its discretion to abstain in narrow circum–
stances.68 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States, held that the district
court’s abstention decision was error in that case because “[a]bstention
from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.”69
Quoting a prior decision, Justice Brennan wrote:
The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may
decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is
an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District
Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication
of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this
doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to
the parties to repair to the State court would serve an important
countervailing interest.70

65.

17A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 122.03
(3d ed. 1999).

66.

Id. § 122.04; see also James Bedell, Note, Clearing the Judicial Fog: Cod–
ifying Abstention, 68 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 943, 945–46 (2018).

67.

See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).

68.

Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813
(1976) (citing County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185,
188–89 (1959)).

69.

Id. at 813.

70.

Id. (quoting Mashuda, 360 U.S. at 188–89) (emphasis added). It is worth
mentioning that there is some question about whether the Colorado River
“exceptional circumstances” test has been abrogated. See Capitol Indem.,
Corp. v. Haverfield, 218 F.3d 872, 874 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing Wilton v. Seven
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289–90 (1995)). Belief that Colorado River has been
abrogated centers around the Court’s decision in Wilton v. Seven Falls,
where the Court ruled that Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America,
316 U.S. 491 (1942), rather than Colorado River applied to cases where the
district court was exercising its discretion in making declaratory judgements.
Wilton, 515 U.S. at 289–90. In cases where the issue is simply whether the
court should exercise its concurrent jurisdiction, federal courts routinely use
the Colorado River “exceptional circumstances” test. See, e.g., Blank River
Servs., Inc. v. Towline River Serv., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 3d 589, 599–603 (W.D.
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The Court continued its analysis by presenting three general
categories where the district court may take the extraordinary step of
abstaining from exercising its jurisdiction.71 First, the district court may
exercise its discretion to abstain when the case presents a federal cons–
titutional issue that might either be mooted or interpreted differently
by the state court in a parallel proceeding.72 Second, abstention might
be appropriate in cases where the federal court would have to resolve a
difficult question of state law better handled by the state courts. 73
Third, and particularly relevant to the present discussion, in criminal
cases, abstention may be appropriate when federal jurisdiction was
invoked to restrain state criminal proceedings based on the Court’s
prior ruling in Younger v. Harris.74
The Court has stated that deferral of a federal proceeding based on
a parallel state proceeding must be based on some kind of exceptional
circumstance.75 Both liberal and conservative justices have repeatedly
written in subsequent cases that the Court’s precedent establishes that
the mere existence of a state proceeding is not enough to justify the
federal court’s deferral of jurisdiction.76 In Sprint Communications v.
Jacobs, the Court explicitly rejected an interpretation of its precedent
that broadly precluded the federal courts from exercising concurrent
jurisdiction, instead favoring an interpretation that constrained the

Pa. 2019) (using Colorado River to decide whether to exercise concurrent
jurisdiction); United States v. Esposito, 371 F. Supp. 3d 288, 297–300 (M.D.
La. 2019) (same). See also Josue Caballero, Note, Colorado River Abstention
Doctrine in the Fifth Circuit: The Exceptional Circumstances of a Likely
Reversal, 64 Baylor L. Rev. 277, 277–78 (2012) (discussing how the Fifth
Circuit often reverses decisions by the district courts to abstain under
Colorado River).
71.

Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 814.

72.

Id. (citing Mashuda, 360 U.S. at 189).

73.

Id. at 815 (citing Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360
U.S. 25 (1959)).

74.

Id. at 816 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971)).

75.

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S.
350, 368 (1988).

76.

See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (“[F]ederal courts and state
courts often find themselves exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the same
subject matter, and when that happens a federal court generally need neither
abstain (i.e., dismiss the case before it) nor defer to the state proceedings . .
. .”) (demonstrating the conservative support for this precedent as authored
by Justice Scalia); Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013)
(“Parallel state-court proceedings do not detract from [the obligation to hear
and decide a case].”) (demonstrating the liberal support for this precedent
as authored by Justice Ginsburg).
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district court’s discretion to cases with an exceptional circumstance.77
Therefore, although the district court may be able to defer to a state
proceeding when the interests of federalism call for doing so, that rule
is by no means an absolute rule requiring the district court to defer
whenever a state proceeding exists. Instead, Supreme Court precedent
suggests that some form of analysis is required on a case-by-case basis
to determine if there is a compelling reason for the court to delay
exercising its jurisdiction.
B.

Prosecutorial Diligence

Another speedy trial interest identified by the courts over the years
has been the interest in seeing prosecutors exercise their due diligence
in bringing cases to trial. Hedgepeth v. United States78 was one of the
first cases to identify this interest and further provides an interesting
fact pattern that is analogous to this discussion. The prosecutor in
Hedgepeth asked for a two-month continuance in order to try Hedgepeth
and his co-defendant together.79 The prosecutor did not provide any
other reason besides that he preferred doing it in one trial.80 The D.C.
Circuit ultimately decided that there was no speedy trial violation
because two months was not significant but stated in dicta that the
prosecutor should have been more prompt in bringing a trial.81 The
court explicitly stated: “It must be borne in mind that the pros–
ecution, not the defense, is charged with bringing a case to trial. The
Government may not ‘sit back’ and then argue that defendant’s
inaction conclusively waived his right to a speedy trial.”82
In 1970, the Supreme Court adopted the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning
in Dickey v. Florida.83 In Dickey, the Court held that the defendant’s
speedy trial right was violated when the state court refused to allow his
immediate prosecution in Florida, partially because the defendant was
“unavailable” for trial in Florida since he was serving a federal
sentence. 84 The Court emphasized that the speedy trial right is
grounded in the hard reality that “fresh claims” are better than “stale
claims,” especially in criminal law.85 The Court reasoned pragmatically
that sometimes delays are inevitable due to overcrowded dockets or
77.

Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 81–82.

78.

364 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

79.

Id. at 686–87.

80.

Id.

81.

Id. at 688–89.

82.

Id. at 687–88.

83.

398 U.S. 30 (1970).

84.

Id. at 32, 37.

85.

Id. at 37.
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lack of judges, but convenience to the state alone was not a valid reason
to delay the defendant’s trial.86 The Court later in Strunk v. United
States87 stated that holding the government to account for delays in the
court system was meant to reaffirm the Court’s prior ruling in Dickey
against prosecutorial convenience as a valid reason for delay.88
C.

Logistical Concerns

Courts on both sides of the circuit split have expressed concerns
about the logistical practicality of holding a parallel state-federal pro–
ceeding. The Fourth Circuit stated as one of its reasons for adopting
the bright-line rule was that parallel proceedings would “increase
inmate transportation back and forth between the state and federal
systems with consequent additional safety risks and administrative
costs.”89 The Tenth Circuit in adopting the ad hoc approach expressed
similar concerns, finding that the government’s reason was not justified
because it made no showing that transporting the defendant five blocks
to the federal courthouse would be burdensome on the government.90
The Supreme Court itself recognized society’s concerns in the economic
cost of a delayed proceeding in Barker, stating that a lengthy detention
of the accused is costly because of the amount of money the state has
to spend to keep the accused imprisoned.91
The cost per inmate of keeping a prisoner in state jail while awaiting
trial is, however, wildly different depending on the state. In 2015, the
cost per inmate varied between $14,780 in Alabama and $69,355 in New
York.92 Therefore, the state’s interest in keeping costs low during the
pretrial phrase is different depending on how expensive keeping that
prisoner available for trial would be.

III. Practical Effect of Each Circuit’s Approach
Although the Supreme Court mandates that the accused’s speedy
trial right be weighed in the context of these competing interests, the
circuits’ approaches to a delayed federal proceeding differ starkly. The
86.

Id. at 38.

87.

412 U.S. 434 (1973).

88.

Id. at 436–37.

89.

United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 150 (4th Cir. 1995).

90.

United States v. Seltzer, 595 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2010).

91.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520–21 (1972).

92.

Prison Spending in 2015, Vera: The Price of Prisons, https://www.
vera.org/publications/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-ofprisons-2015-state-spending-trends/price-of-prisons-2015-state-spending-tre
nds-prison-spending (last accessed Jan. 17, 2020) [https://perma.cc/L4GL6HU2].
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circuit split for purposes of this discussion revolves around the second
Barker factor, the reason for the delay. The circuits essentially differ in
the level of deference given to the federal government’s decision to delay
the proceeding until the conclusion of the state’s case. The earliest cases
addressing this issue in the Fourth Circuit adopted a bright-line app–
roach where delaying to avoid a parallel prosecution is always a valid
reason requiring no further analysis from the court.93 However, more
recently, circuit courts have declined to follow the original bright-line
rule and instead require more analysis to determine whether the federal
government had a legitimate reason to avoid a parallel prosecution.
This amounts to essentially an ad hoc analysis within the Barker overall
ad hoc test.94 It is important to look at how both tests work in practice
and how that practice fits within the speedy trial jurisprudence
discussed above.
A.

Bright-Line Rule

The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Thomas 95 was the first
circuit to adopt the bright-line rule. Thomas was in county jail facing
various state charges related to evading arrest and killing a bicyclist
while fleeing in his car when the federal government issued an indict–
ment for drug charges.96 Thomas was not arraigned in federal court
until two years later.97 The Fourth Circuit stated that, in addition to
the other reasons the government provided for the delay in formally
beginning the pretrial proceedings, the government had an obvious
reason for the delay in that it had to wait for the state proceedings to
conclude.98
The Sixth Circuit’s holding in United States v. Schreane99 provides
a little more context for how the circuit courts apply the bright-line
rule. Schreane involved two delays in the pre-federal proceedings, one
of which was caused by the federal government waiting for state pro–
ceedings to conclude.100 Although the court’s opinion stressed that this
reason alone does not make the whole delay automatically permissible,
93.

See, e.g., Thomas, 55 F.3d at 150–51 (finding that a delay caused by a state
proceeding was an “obvious reason” for delaying the defendant’s federal
prosecution, without specific analysis into the practicality of a parallel pro–
secution).

94.

See, e.g., Seltzer, 595 F.3d at 1178.

95.

55 F.3d 144.

96.

Id. at 147.

97.

Id.

98.

Id. at 150–51.

99.

331 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2003).

100. Id. at 554–55.

338

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
The Speedy Trial Clause and Parallel State-Federal Prosecutions

the court held that delaying for the conclusion of a state prosecution is
a “valid reason” and thus a factor in favor of the government.101 The
application of this rule is therefore simple; a delay caused by the
government waiting for the conclusion of a state proceeding is a valid
reason that weighs in favor of the government in a Barker second-factor
analysis. The court offered no further analysis into the circumstances
of that potential parallel proceeding, only whether or not the concurrent
state proceeding exists.
The obvious problem with this approach is that it ignores the
Supreme Court’s emphasis on considering the case in its “particular
context.”102 The Sixth Circuit’s rule considers only one aspect of the
government’s reasoning—whether there was a state proceeding happen–
ing at the same time the federal government wanted to pursue a
prosecution. For this rule to be remotely contextual, other aspects of
the problems caused by doing state and federal parallel proceedings
would have to exist in every case. This is far from accurate. By the
Fourth and Sixth Circuits’ own logic, the bright-line rule is necessary
to avoid confusion and disarray in parallel federal and state pros–
ecutions,103 yet it makes no provision for defendants like the one in
United States v. Seltzer whose state charges were completely unrelated
to their federal charges, making confusion in the law unlikely.104 The
rule emphasizes the increased administrative costs of transporting a
prisoner from state custody to federal court but provides no leeway for
a defendant sitting in state custody for months without a hearing in a
jail five blocks from the federal courthouse.105 According to the Supreme
Court, context matters in these cases, but the bright-line rule ignores
most of the context surrounding the case when the court reaches its
decision.
The bright-line rule also wholly ignores why the context is so
important to speedy trial cases and why the Supreme Court adopted a
balancing test rather than a bright-line rule in the first place. The
Speedy Trial Clause is “generically different” from any other procedural
right because not only does the defendant have an interest in the speed
of a prosecution—society does as well.106 The bright-line rule effectively
limits the district court to considering only whether or not a state
proceeding exists, regardless of any other circumstances of the case,
instead of conducting the balancing analysis that Supreme Court
101. Id. at 555.
102. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
103. Thomas, 55 F.3d at 150–51.
104. See United States v. Seltzer, 595 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2010).
105. See id.
106. Barker, 407 U.S. at 519.
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precedent requires. If, for example, a defendant faces both state and
federal charges but is factually innocent,107 society would have a strong
interest in seeing that defendant fairly and quickly adjudicated both for
the sake of justice and to prevent an innocent person’s stay in prison.108
If having a parallel federal and state proceeding is otherwise reasonable,
society would benefit from having those proceedings occur sooner rather
than later in order to limit the innocent person’s stay in jail and prevent
an innocent person from pleading guilty.109 The bright-line rule does not
allow for a nuanced analysis of context, only permitting the district
court to consider whether there is a state proceeding and, if so,
commanding the court to end its analysis of the second Barker factor
there.
The whole basis for the circuit courts’ adherence to this rule, in the
interests of federalism, further contradicts Supreme Court precedent on
concurrent proceedings. As discussed above, the Court’s concurrentjurisdiction precedents establish that federal courts must err on the side
of exercising their jurisdiction rather than deferring it. 110 Only in
exceptional circumstances can the district court exercise discretion to
defer adjudicating the matter until the state court finishes its pro–
ceeding.111 The bright-line rule does not allow the district court to even
consider the circumstances of the state court proceeding to determine
whether abstaining from having parallel proceedings is an exceptional
circumstance in the first place.112 Instead, it simply assumes that there
is an exceptional circumstance and allows the district court to defer the
exercise of its jurisdiction just because a state proceeding exists.
B.

Ad Hoc Approach

On the other side of the circuit split, the Tenth Circuit in United
States v. Seltzer was the first court of appeals to outline an ad hoc
approach in contradiction to the bright-line rules that came before it.113
Instead of deferring automatically to the government’s decision to delay
107. See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Innocent Defendants Pleading
Guilty, 30 Crim. Just. 45, 45 (2015) (discussing how innocent defendants are
sometimes charged due to prosecutorial “tunnel vision”).
108. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 520–21 (recognizing society’s interest in fair pro–
cedure and limiting pretrial detention).
109. See John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually
Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 157, 174–75
(2014) (explaining that innocent defendants charged with relatively minor
crimes are more likely to plead guilty in order to get out of jail).
110. See supra Part II-A.
111. Sprint Commc’ns., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013).
112. See supra Part III-A.
113. 595 F.3d 1170, 1177–78 (10th Cir. 2010).
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because of a state proceeding, the court instead decided to scrutinize
the decision.114 The court focused on three distinct aspects of the case
that convinced it that a parallel proceeding would have been possible.
First, the accused in Seltzer was facing state drug charges which were
completely unrelated to his federal counterfeiting charges.115 This fact,
in the Tenth Circuit’s view, counseled against the conflicting assertions
by both the state and federal courts that a parallel prosecution would
lead to confusion in the law.116 Second, the court found that because
the federal courthouse in Grand Junction, Colorado, where the defen–
dant would be federally prosecuted, was only five blocks from the
county jail where the defendant was being held, transporting him to
the federal courthouse for his federal proceeding would not have been
“logistically cumbersome.”117 Lastly, the court found that the relative
simplicity of the charges against the defendant made the burden of
conducting a parallel prosecution for the federal government very light
in comparison to a more complicated case.118
The Ninth Circuit in Myers, on the other hand, confined its analysis
to a single test: whether there was such a factual overlap in the state
and federal charges that a concurrent prosecution would create “admin–
istrative hurdles and safety concerns.” 119 Although it seems like a
starkly different test than the one put forward by the Tenth Circuit in
Seltzer, the Ninth Circuit’s test in practice looks remarkably similar to
the Seltzer approach. On remand, the district court took the Ninth
Circuit’s test and extensively analyzed whether a parallel prosecution
would have been “logistically cumbersome.” 120 While society has an
interest in speedy prosecution—and therefore whether a parallel pros–
ecution would be logistically cumbersome—this is not the only societal
interest.121 Therefore, it is best to view the Ninth Circuit’s test as yet
another factor that falls under a broader, multi-factor test.
Put in more general terms, the ad hoc approach considers a number
of factors, including whether there was an overlap in the state and
federal charges, whether parallel proceedings would have been logist–
ically cumbersome, and whether the government would have been
114. Id. at 1177–79.
115. Id. at 1178.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1178–79.
119. United States v. Myers, 930 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2019).
120. See United States v. Myers, No. 2:15-cr-0045-SMJ-1, 2020 WL 475822, at *4–
5 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 29, 2020) (analyzing the government’s asserted “admin–
istrative hurdles” of a parallel prosecution, such as the coordination of dis–
covery, witnesses, evidence, and experts).
121. See United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 150 (4th Cir. 1995); see also
supra Part II-C.
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unduly burdened by a parallel prosecution, before the district court can
determine whether the reason for delay was truly valid and could weigh
in favor of the government. The ad hoc approach does not automatically
assume, as the bright-line rule does, that parallel state and federal
proceedings are unreasonable but instead takes into consideration the
unique circumstances of the case to determine whether the government
was justified in waiting. This already does far more in considering the
context as the Supreme Court mandated in Barker than the bright-line
rule does.

IV. Hypotheticals
Although the ad hoc approach is more consistent with the purpose
of the Speedy Trial Clause and more generally with the Supreme
Court’s precedent, critics of interest-balancing approaches may still
argue that a bright-line rule is appropriate. If, for instance, district
courts applying the ad hoc approach always found the government’s
delay justified, requiring heightened judicial scrutiny over the decision
to delay would needlessly complicate the judicial process.122 To counter
these concerns, this Note will put forward four hypotheticals: the first
will present a case where delay is clearly necessary; the second, a case
where delay is clearly unnecessary; the third, a more ambiguous case
where delay may be appropriate; and the fourth, another ambiguous
case where delay may be appropriate for some of the proceedings but
not for others.
This Note will then take on the role of a district court judge and
apply the facts of the hypotheticals to a number of factors to consider
why or why not delay may be appropriate. The discussion will be
framed around the three broad factors discussed in Seltzer’s ad hoc test:
(1) overlap in state and federal charges, (2) logistical concerns, and
(3) burden on the federal government.123 The discussion of logistical
concerns will further address the Ninth Circuit’s factor, factual overlap
creating administrative hurdles.124
A.

First Hypothetical—Clear Case for Delay

Octavio Alpha, a felon with a prior violent felony conviction, runs
a multi-state fraud scheme from his home in Nevada. Alpha and two
accomplices, Jesse White and Walter Pinkman, steal personal informa–
122. See Andrew McLetchie, Note, The Case for Bright-Line Rules in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence: Adopting the Tenth Circuit’s Bright-Line Test
for Determining the Voluntariness of Consent, 30 Hofstra L. Rev. 225,
228 (2001) (“The advocates of bright-line rules essentially believe that the
rules provide easy to follow guidelines for law enforcement, defense lawyers,
prosecutors, and judges alike.”).
123. Seltzer, 595 F.3d at 1178–79.
124. Myers, 930 F.3d at 1121.
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tion from the Dark Web and use the stolen information to forge driver’s
licenses and other documents. Alpha, White, and Pinkman then use
those forged documents to secure financing from banks, credit unions,
and retailers to purchase expensive items like vehicles, clothing, and
cell phones. They start the scheme in Nevada but expand to Utah and
California.
Alpha and Pinkman are pulled over in Utah for a routine traffic
stop after purchasing cell phones in California as part of their scheme.
In a subsequent search of Alpha’s car, the officer discovers a gun in a
backpack in the backseat. Utah state prosecutors initially charge Alpha
with being a felon in possession of a firearm.125 California state pros–
ecutors also bring a wire fraud charge126 against Alpha for his recent
fraudulent purchase of cell phones in California.
After an FBI investigation, the federal prosecutors in Nevada
realize that Alpha is the ringleader of a multi-state scheme and bring
an indictment against him charging him with wire fraud127 and being a
felon in possession.128 The federal prosecutors also bring similar indict–
ments against Pinkman and White. White, however, is currently in jail
awaiting trial for unrelated Colorado state charges. The federal
prosecutors decide to delay the proceedings against Alpha until his state
proceedings in Utah and California conclude and until White becomes
available to testify against Alpha.
The first factor in the Seltzer ad hoc analysis is whether there is
any overlap of state and federal charges. The Tenth Circuit’s analysis
is limited to whether the state and federal charges are the same or
similar in order to avoid “conflicting motions or assertions in the
different courts.”129 In Alpha’s case, there are multiple overlaps that can
create conflicts. Alpha is facing two concurrent state and federal charges
for being a felon in possession and for wire fraud. Any one of these
concurrent charges creates the possibility of conflicting rulings that can
lead to confusion. Taking the concurrent felon-in-possession charges as
an example, the fact that police officers found the firearm in a backpack
raises issues about whether or not the government has enough evidence
that Alpha “possessed” the firearm without proof that the backpack
belonged to him. The outcome of the court’s ruling may depend on in
125. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (2017).
126. Cal. Penal Code § 538.5 (2011).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2018).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018).
129. See United States v. Seltzer, 595 F.3d 1170, 1178 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding
no overlap because the state charge was for drug possession while the federal
charge was for counterfeiting); see also United States v. Medina, 918 F.3d
774, 788–89 (10th Cir. 2019) (finding an overlap because the defendant had
both state and federal felon-in-possession charges).
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which court Alpha is pleading his case.130 A parallel proceeding there–
fore carries the potential that any ruling would conflict with the rulings
of the other court, a concern justifying delay of the federal proceeding.
The second factor in the Seltzer test is whether parallel prosecutions
would be logistically cumbersome.131 The logistical and administrative
hurdles in Alpha’s case would be immense considering the multiple state
prosecutions and potential number of victim-witnesses spread out over
three states for the fraud charges. The cost and time alone to transport
Alpha from state custody in either Utah or California to a federal
courthouse in Nevada would be enough to justify a delay. 132 The
administrative ordeal to arrange a parallel proceeding with the same
witnesses, experts, and physical evidence, however, would be an even
further justification for delaying the federal proceeding.133
The third factor in the Seltzer test, burden on the federal gov–
ernment, focuses on one distinct issue: the complexity of the federal
government’s case.134 If, for example, the federal government’s case is
more complicated and requires more time to effectively prosecute, it is,
in the Tenth Circuit’s view, reasonable for the federal government to
defer to the state, and delay, in order to avoid conflict.135 That is the
situation here. The federal prosecutors are prosecuting Alpha for a
multi-state financial fraud scheme that covers potentially hundreds of
witnesses and thousands of evidentiary documents.136 It would not be
mere convenience for the federal prosecutors to want to delay the
proceeding when the evidence they need to prosecute their case is
located in far-flung state courts. It would instead be justifiable for the
130. Compare State v. Lucero, 350 P.3d 237, 243 (Utah Ct. App. 2015) (holding
that the government did not have sufficient evidence that the defendant
constructively possessed a firearm in a backpack within the defendant’s reach
in a co-occupied car), with United States v. Benford, 875 F.3d 1007, 1016 (10th
Cir. 2017) (holding that the government had sufficient evidence that the
defendant constructively possessed a firearm in a backpack at his cohabited
apartment).
131. Seltzer, 595 F.3d at 1178.
132. See Medina, 918 F.3d at 789 (finding delay justified because the defendant
was in custody in multiple states facing state charges for 300 days before
the federal government could get custody of him).
133. See United States v. Myers, No. 2:15-cr-0045-SMJ-1, 2020 WL 475822, at
*4–5 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 29, 2020) (finding that the difficulty in coordinating
the government’s witnesses and evidence for parallel proceedings in the same
judicial district weighed this Barker factor slightly in favor of the govern–
ment).
134. Seltzer, 595 F.3d at 1178–79.
135. Id.
136. See Medina, 918 F.3d at 789 (finding that a multi-state financial fraud pros–
ecution justified delaying the start of federal proceeding).
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federal government to want to delay the federal proceedings against
Alpha in order to ensure access to the large amount of testimonial
evidence they need to prosecute their case.
B.

Second Hypothetical—Clear Case for Parallel Prosecutions

Cleveland police pull over Tom Beta in a routine traffic stop. The
officer smells marijuana and searches the car finding a small amount of
marijuana. A week later, Secret Service agents execute a search warrant
on Beta’s home in Cleveland suspecting a counterfeiting operation and
find bags full of counterfeited dollar bills. Ohio state prosecutors charge
Beta with drug possession,137 while the U.S. Attorney brings a federal
indictment for counterfeiting U.S. currency.138 Since Beta does not have
a prior criminal history and is not deemed a flight risk, the judge decides
to release Beta on bail. The federal prosecutors want to delay the
counterfeiting proceeding until Ohio finishes its drug possession
prosecution.
Unlike the first hypothetical, there is no overlap in the state and
federal charges against Beta. Ohio has to prove in its drug possession
prosecution that Beta knowingly possessed a controlled substance.139
The United States on the other hand has to prove that Beta, with intent
to defraud, counterfeited “any obligation or other security of the United
States.”140 The state does not need to use any evidence of the counter–
feiting that the federal government will use in its case and vice versa.
Therefore, any evidentiary ruling made in one case will not conflict with
the rulings in the other case because none of the evidence will be the
same. In other words, there is little risk involved in holding parallel
proceedings because there is little opportunity for either court to make
contradictory rulings that would intrude on the other court’s authority.
Also, unlike the first hypothetical, there are few logistical concerns
that justify delay. Beta has been released on bail, so the federal
government does not need to transport him from state custody, only
schedule his court date. While there might be some concern that his
federal court dates will overlap with his state court dates, it is certainly
an easier problem to deal with than a defendant in a completely
different state in state custody. Furthermore, there will be no problem
scheduling witnesses or getting access to physical evidence because none
of it will be the same in either proceeding. Beta’s state and federal
137. Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.11(A) (West 2019).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 471 (2012).
139. Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.11(A) (West 2019); see also Ohio Jury Instr.
§ 525.11 (Ohio Jud. Conf. 2020).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 471 (2018). See also 2 Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E. Grenig
& William C. Lee, Federal Jury Practice & Instructions § 32.03
(6th ed. 2020).
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charges arise out of different factual events with different officers
making the search and collecting different physical evidence.
Finally, the federal government’s case is not complex. It is
prosecuting a single defendant on a single charge of counterfeiting for
an operation that was done locally in Beta’s home in Ohio.141 None of
the government’s witnesses are already tied up in Beta’s state
proceeding since they were not there. Unlike a more complicated, multistate case, the federal government would not be overly burdened with
a parallel prosecution. Delay would simply be done out of convenience
rather than any legitimate concern.
C.

Third Hypothetical—Unclear Case

Police officers in Tucson, Arizona, arrest defendant Jazmine Carter
after she sells methamphetamine to a DEA informant. During the
arrest, Carter punches one of the arresting officers in the jaw. The
Arizona state prosecutor charges her with aggravated assault against a
peace officer, 142 while the U.S. Attorney in Tucson brings a federal
indictment against her for drug trafficking.143 The federal government
wants to delay the drug trafficking proceeding until after the state’s
aggravated assault proceedings conclude.
The state and federal charges against Carter do not overlap. Both
crimes are distinct, requiring the government to prove completely
different elements. To sustain Carter’s conviction under the criminal
statute, the federal prosecutor would have to prove two essential
elements: (1) Carter “knowingly and intentionally distributed” meth–
amphetamine, and (2) “at the time of such distribution, the defendant
knew that the substance distributed” was methamphetamine. 144 In
comparison, the Arizona state prosecutor has to prove two essential
elements: (1) Carter committed an assault, and (2) the assault was
aggravated because the defendant knew or had reason to know the
person assaulted was a peace officer.145 In terms of evidence, the federal
prosecutor only has to rely on evidence of the drug buy itself, while the
state prosecutor has to rely primarily on the events following the buy,
namely the escape and the punching of the officer, to prove the elements
of assault. This makes conflicting rulings in the different courts unlikely
because the relevant evidence in both cases will be different. Even if
141. See United States v. Seltzer, 595 F.3d 1170, 1178–79 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding
that a counterfeiting charge against a single defendant was not so compli–
cated that a parallel prosecution was infeasible).
142. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1203(A)(1), 13-1204(A)(8)(a) (2020).
143. 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (2018).
144. O’Malley et al., supra 140, § 64.03.
145. Revised Ariz. Jury Instructions—Criminal § 12.04 (State Bar of
Ariz. 2016).
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the state prosecutor were to admit evidence of the drug buy to prove
intent,146 that evidence would be admitted under an entirely different
rule than the federal court. If either the state or federal court were to
make a ruling on the admissibility of the evidence, it would have no
effect on the parallel proceeding.
Logistical concerns are where this case becomes less certain.
Assuming Carter is kept at the Pima County Adult Detention Complex,
the distances between the jail and the state and federal courthouses are
both under three miles, and it take roughly ten minutes to get to either
courthouse by motor vehicle.147 Therefore, transporting Carter to her
federal proceeding would be reasonable. 148 One problem, however,
would be the availability of witnesses. Both the state aggravated assault
case and the federal drug trafficking case would require testimony from
the officers involved in Carter’s arrest. On the other hand, considering
the long felony case-processing times in the Pima County prosecutor’s
office,149 there is a distinct possibility that the state prosecution will
take long enough to make scheduling a parallel federal prosecution, at
the very least, feasible.150 The point is that every case is unique. Some
cases take longer than others and some have untenable scheduling
conflicts. Courts following the bright-line rule do not take those diff–
erent circumstances into account. Finally, the burden on the federal
government would again be light considering the simplicity of the

146. See Ariz. R. Evid. 404(b) (allowing for the admission of prior bad-act evi–
dence to prove a defendant’s intent).
147. Compare Driving Directions from Pima County Adult Detention Complex to
Pima County Superior Court, Google Maps, https://www.maps.google.com
(follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point field “Pima County
Adult Detention Complex” and search destination field “Pima County
Superior Court”) [https://perma.cc/T8ZG-3GH4], with Driving Directions
from Pima County Adult Detention Complex to James A. Walsh Federal
Courthouse, Google Maps, https://maps.google.com (follow “Directions”
hyperlink; then search starting point field “Pima County Adult Detention
Complex” and search destination field “James A. Walsh Federal Court–
house”) [https://perma.cc/GW5H-TH6K].
148. See United States v. Myers, No. 2:15-cr-0045-SMJ-1, 2020 WL 475822, at *4
(E.D. Wash. Jan. 29, 2020) (finding that transport to a federal courthouse
“within miles” of a detention center potentially made parallel prosecution
reasonable).
149. Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 261, 286 n.122 (2011) (citing Kim Smith, Why Wheels of Justice Roll
Slowly in Tucson, Ariz. Daily Star (Dec. 26, 2006), https://www.tucson
.com/news/local/why-wheels-of-justice-roll-slowly-in-tucson/article_6d800
46e-c561-5b72-b3ba-767d4bf1cacc.html [https://perma.cc/39WJ-EC4V]).
150. See Myers, 2020 WL 475822, at *5 (finding that a parallel federal proceeding
was possible because the state proceedings took longer than anticipated).
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federal charges against Carter. Carter is a single defendant and not a
member of a wider drug trafficking conspiracy.
D.

Fourth Hypothetical—Another Unclear Case

Police in Toledo, Ohio, arrive at the home of John Delta to execute
an arrest warrant for trafficking heroin. Delta is able to jump out the
window to evade arrest. He runs down the street and steals a car at
gunpoint from a passing motorist. Delta then drives across the border
into Michigan. Michigan police pursue Delta in a high-speed chase near
Monroe, Michigan. Delta loses control of his vehicle and hits a passing
bicyclist, killing him. Michigan prosecutors charge Delta with firstdegree murder based on his killing a person during the perpetration of
a controlled substance offense.151 The prosecutors back in Ohio charge
Delta with grand theft auto.152 The U.S. Attorney then brings a federal
indictment against him for drug trafficking.153 The federal prosecutors
want to delay until Delta’s Michigan and Ohio state prosecutions have
concluded.
This hypothetical presents a unique problem where delay is
definitely appropriate for the Michigan charge but may not be approp–
riate for the Ohio charge. Considering overlap of charges, while there is
no overlap between the elements of grand theft auto and drug
trafficking,154 the Michigan state prosecutor would have to prove Delta
was engaged in drug trafficking as the underlying felony in order to
sustain a first-degree murder conviction under a felony-murder theo–
ry.155 The Michigan prosecutor would likely want to introduce much of
the same evidence as the federal prosecutors in Toledo, creating a
situation where different courts can make different rulings regarding
the admissibility of the evidence. Therefore, in the interest of avoiding
confusion, the federal government has a legitimate reason to delay for
the Michigan proceeding but less so for the dissimilar Ohio state charge.
The burden on the federal government, however, would be relatively
light during a federal prosecution because it is dealing with a single
defendant, not engaged in a major conspiracy.
This case, however, raises several logistical dilemmas. Although
Toledo and Monroe are relatively close to each other, under a thirty-

151. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316(1)(b) (2020); People v. Gillis, 712 N.W.2d
419, 426 (Mich. 2006) (holding that a killing committed during an attempt
to escape was done in perpetration of the felonious act).
152. Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.02(B)(5) (West 2019).
153. 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) (2018).
154. Compare Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.02(B)(5) (West 2019) with 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2018).
155. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316(1)(b) (2020).

348

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 1·2020
The Speedy Trial Clause and Parallel State-Federal Prosecutions

minute drive, 156 the fact that the Michigan charge is a first-degree
murder charge changes the logistics. Murder charges are inherently
complex, requiring more deference to the state to effectively complete
its murder prosecution.157 If the federal government were to continually
transfer Delta to another jurisdiction during such a complex pros–
ecution, it would likely be a detriment to the state’s ability to effectively
prosecute. 158 The availability of witnesses and evidence would also
create problems. The Michigan prosecutors would need many of the
same witnesses and evidence as the federal prosecutors, because they
would have to prove Delta was engaging in drug trafficking in order to
sustain his first-degree murder conviction. If there is going to be a
parallel prosecution, coordinating these witnesses and evidence could be
difficult and therefore could be a legitimate reason for delay. 159 A
parallel prosecution in Ohio, however, would not present these same
issues. A grand theft auto charge is not as complex as a first-degree
murder charge, and although there may be some overlap in witnesses,
especially the police officers needed to prove intent and opportunity,
key witnesses will not overlap, such as the person whose car Delta stole.
Since the grand theft auto took place in Ohio, the witnesses involved
would also most likely be in Ohio. In other words, delay would be
justified in waiting for Michigan’s prosecution to end but may not be
justified for Ohio’s prosecution.

Conclusion
The Speedy Trial Clause requires flexibility. It is a right fund–
amental to the American system of justice and yet must remain
amenable to numerous interests at play in any given criminal pros–
ecution. No two cases are alike, and the interests underlying all of them
will necessarily be different as well. Therefore, the right should not be
governed by an inflexible rule that ignores the differences of a case. It
must be governed by one that allows the district court to use its
discretion to determine whether a delay is reasonable. Even if a parallel
proceeding creates a burden, that burden will never be the same in any
given case, and thus, like every other factor in the speedy trial analysis,
should be considered within the case’s context. State and federal
156. Driving Directions from Toledo, Ohio to Monroe, Michigan, Google Maps,
https://www.maps.google.com (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search
starting point field “Toledo, Ohio” and search destination field “Monroe,
Michigan”) [https://perma.cc/EKQ5-XBY3].
157. United States v. Nixon, 919 F.3d 1265, 1272 (10th Cir. 2019).
158. Id. at 1271.
159. United States v. Myers, No. 2:15-cr-0045-SMJ-1, 2020 WL 475822, at *4
(E.D. Wash. Jan. 29, 2020).
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proceedings are no different. Sometimes the state may have a strong
interest in prosecuting a defendant without a parallel federal pro–
ceeding, but other times it may not. When the district court again
decides Christopher Ray Myers’ fate, it should keep in mind that this
five-year long prosecution should have ended sooner if the federal
government had only started the proceedings earlier. But the federal
government delayed, simply because it was more convenient to wait. A
fundamental right deserves more scrutiny than that.
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